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INTRODUCTION
April 27, 1933:
The Great Depression continued to devastate the nation's agricul-
tural sector, and farm foreclosures reached epidemic proportions.' Judi-
cial supervision of farm foreclosure sales quickly became the focus of
popular discontent, and judges were the natural target of agrarian ani-
mosity.2 It was perhaps no great surprise that public outrage boiled over
in the small northwest Iowa town of Le Mars-specifically targeting
Judge Charles C. Bradley. 3 Around 5 p.m., a group of farmers "swept
into the courtroom" and demanded that the judge "[p]romise [not to] sign
any more foreclosure actions."'4 When Judge Bradley refused, he was
"dragged... into the courthouse square."'5 One of the farmers "produced
a rope and pulled it taut around the judge's neck ... [but] Judge Bradley
still would not swear the oath the farmers demanded. The mob lifted him
up off the ground by the rope, and he appeared to collapse."'6 Upon a
warning that the elderly judge might die if the violence continued, the
mob dispersed, leaving Judge Bradley with "his neck chafed, his lips
bloody, his hair and face filthy."'7 Commentators later noted that "Judge
Bradley ... could scarcely have done more to uphold the honor of his
office."8 In this sense, Judge Bradley represents the judicial ideal; a
judge willing to risk personal harm, even death, to uphold the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary-goals most agree judicial selection
methods should be designed to further. Although Bradley's case pro-
vides an admittedly extreme example, it was concern over threats to judi-
cial independence that fueled the establishment of merit selection as a
compromise between accountability and independence within state judi-
cial systems.
1 See RICHARD, LORD ACTON & PATRICIA NASSIF ACTON, To Go FREE: A TREASURY
OF IOWA'S LEGAL HERITAGE 248-49 (1995) ("About half of Iowa's farmers financed their
lands through mortgage debt, and with the collapse in the prices of produce, foreclosures
became inevitable.").
2 See id.
3 See id. at 250-5 1.
4 Id. at 252 (stating the judge's refusal was based on the fact that "he had not sufficient
time to study the fifteen cases then before him.").
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 254 ("Even in explaining his reluctance to comment on the episode to the press,
the judge maintained a dignified reticence: 'It is not ethical for the bar to get into the
limelight."').
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE
Strategies have changed over the last eighty years, but interest
groups still attempt to influence the judiciary-albeit more subtly than
their 1930s predecessors. One common method is through the use of
candidate surveys designed to flesh out a judge's positions or personal
views on disputed issues with the implicit purpose of then using this
information to shape voting decisions regarding a specific judge's elec-
tion or retention.9 Interest groups surveys are a relatively new phenome-
non largely triggered by the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, which held the state's "an-
nounce clause"-an ethical canon which formerly restricted the ability of
judicial candidates to discuss disputed legal and political issues-uncon-
stitutional.' 0 To date, attention from the academy has almost exclusively
focused on the decision's impact on the remaining judicial canons and
upon overall judicial independence. 1' Surprisingly absent from the writ-
ings of those critical of White, however, is any discussion of the role
judicial selection methods can play in promoting judicial independence;
more specifically, the potential of a merit-based system to remove the
need for information regarding a judge's personal viewpoints and per-
spectives. This Article is an initial attempt to fill this void. This Article
argues that merit selection can play a role in addressing the threat
presented by White to the independence and impartiality of state judicial
systems. Justice O'Connor made this clear in her White concurrence,
noting that the real problem with Minnesota's judicial selection process
was that the state:
[H]as chosen to select its judges through contested popu-
lar elections instead of through an appointment system
or a combined appointment and retention election sys-
tem along the lines of the Missouri Plan. In doing so the
State has voluntarily taken on the risks to judicial
bias .... As a result, the State's claim that it needs to
9 See, e.g., FAMILY ACTION COUNCIL OF TENNESSEE, 2006 FAMILY ACTION COUNCIL OF
TENNESSEE VOTERS' GUIDE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL CANDIDATES (2006), http://www.
factn.org/documents/Tennessee 3.pdf (providing an example of a recent interest group
survey).
10 536 U.S. 765 (2002); see Thomas R. Phillips & Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for
Judges and Fair Appeals for Litigants: Judicial Recusal in a Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L.
REV. 691, 702 (2007) (White and other free-speech decisions "have created a sea change in
judicial campaign practices." Special interest groups are no longer obliged to conduct inde-
pendent campaigns in a "parallel universe" while the candidates run issue-free "Marquis of
Queensbury" campaigns.).
I See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Min-
nesota v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181 (2004); Wendy R. Weiser, Regulating Judges' Politi-
cal Activity After White, 68 ALB. L. REV. 651 (2005); Christopher Rapp, Note, The Will of the
People, the Independence of the Judiciary, and Free Speech in Judicial Elections After Repub-
lican Party of Minnesota v. White, 21 J.L. & POL. 103 (2005).
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significantly restrict judges' speech in order to protect
judicial impartiality is particularly troubling. If the State
has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one
brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popu-
larly electing judges. 12
Part I of this Article will briefly provide an overview of current
judicial selection methods, focusing on the policy considerations under-
lying the historical development of merit selection. Part II will focus on
the role ethical canons were originally intended to perform and the over-
all impact of the White decision. Part III will discuss how the concept of
what constitutes an "informed voter" is fundamentally shaped by a juris-
diction's choice of selection method. This Part will specifically detail
what information is relevant to voters within merit selection systems in
light of the system's nonpolitical nature. Part IV will then explore the
issue of how information should be relayed to voters-specifically focus-
ing on the role of state-sponsored judicial evaluation programs.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL SELECTIONS
A threshold constitutional decision for any jurisdiction is deciding
upon a method of selecting its judges. From the earliest days of the re-
public, much attention has been devoted to the issue of judicial selec-
tion-specifically on the development of a selection method able to
preserve the independence of the judiciary while also ensuring that
judges remain, in some degree, accountable. 13 Over the course of Amer-
ican history, however, no single method has gained uniform acceptance
and such consensus will likely remain elusive. 14 This is perhaps not sur-
prising as past efforts to reconcile these competing objectives have been
12 White, 536 U.S. at 792.
13 See Stephen B. Presser et al., The Case for Judicial Appointments, 33 U. TOL. L. REv.
353, 357 (2002) (explaining how "the question posed has remained the same: Is it more ap-
propriate in a constitutional republic to have judicial branch officials sworn to apply the law
with the utmost objectivity and independence appointed by an executive or elected by the
people?"); Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best"
Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. Rv. 1, 2-3 (1995) (explaining "[t]he debate over selection and
tenure of judges has been ongoing since shortly after the founding of our nation. Although not
frequently recognized as such, the debate, is in reality, but one manifestation of a much more
fundamental philosophical and political disagreement regarding the role of judges in our politi-
cal system.").
14 See PHILIP L. DUBoIs, FRoM BALLOT TO BENCH 1-6 (1980) (detailing the history of
judicial selections in the United States and the myriad forms implemented at the state level);
Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection Reform: The Need to Develop a Model
Appointive Selection Plan for Judges in Light of Experience, 68 ALB. L. REv. 597 (2005);
Joseph E. Lambert, Contestable Judicial Elections: Maintaining Respectability in the Post-
White Era, 94 Ky. L.J. 1 (2005) ("There is no consensus among the states and the federal
government as to the best method of judicial selection.").
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met with strong skepticism, 15 and states may have valid reasons for as-
signing different values to either objective based on the state's political
situation. 16 Depending upon the relative values attached to the goals of
judicial accountability and independence, the form of judicial selections
can vary considerably. As a result, although selection methods have
evolved, this evolution has not followed a consistent trajectory or direc-
tion.17 Instead, the debate over how to select judges can be more readily
analogized to that of a giant pendulum swinging between the two almost
inapposite objectives of judicial accountability and independence; the di-
rection of which is dictated by the public's vision of the judiciary at a
given point in time. 18 For example, if a state decides that independence
is the primary objective, judges may become disconnected from political
reality; thus undermining public acceptance of judicial decisions and the
very legitimacy of the state's judiciary. 19 If, on the other hand, the state
decides to focus on accountability, judges will be forced into the role of
politicians and may be overly sensitive to the demands of the voting pub-
lic. 20 In such jurisdictions, a judge will likely need to campaign, and
strong incentives exist for judges to become immersed in the political
process-an activity anathematic to the both traditional and contempo-
rary views of a judge's role in society. 21
One can get a sense of the present state of this debate by looking to
current state practice. Five forms of judicial selection are currently uti-
lized among the states: "two forms of election (partisan and nonpartisan),
two forms of appointment (gubernatorial and legislative), and one ap-
pointment/election hybrid (the merit plan)." 22 Many states utilize differ-
ent methods depending on the level of the court and variation within
15 See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 43, 79
(2003) (explaining that the general institutional reluctance to alter judicial selections, in this
case toward an appointive model, "is akin to tilting at windmills.").
16 See, e.g., R. Darcy, Conflict and Reform: Oklahoma Judicial Elections 1907-1998, 26
OKLA. Crr U. L. REv. 519, 519 (2001) (explaining Oklahoma's efforts to "evolve away from
politics, corruption, and outside pressure toward fairness, impartiality, and judicial indepen-
dence" and how this desire affected the choice of selection method utilized).
17 See F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional Change
in the State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 440-41 (2004).
18 See Leslie Southwick, The Least of Evils for Judicial Selection, 21 Miss. C. L. REV.
209, 212 (2002) ("A fair indication of the pendulum swings in sentiments around the country
is that all the states that entered the Union before 1845 provided for appointed judges.").
19 See Micheal R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to that Man Behind the Robe: Judicial
Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301,
311-12 (2003).
20 See James Layman, Judicial Campaign Speech Regulation: Integrity or Incentives?,
19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 769, 770 (2006). See generally Dimino, supra note 19, at 302-03.
21 See Dimino, supra note 19, at 311-12.
22 See Hanssen, supra note 17, at 431-32.
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even these five categories is widespread. 23 To provide an overall view of
the role that selection methods can play in promoting various societal
objectives, this Part will focus on the historical evolution of merit selec-
tion. This Part will also discuss the interaction between judicial selection
methods and political speech.
A. FOUNDING PRACTICES-JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT
Initially, colonial experience with appointed judges colored deci-
sion-making. 24 Appointment was still the chosen method, but in a
slightly different fashion reflecting an early American distrust of execu-
tive power-requiring legislative approval under the early model.25 As a
result, early state constitutions used the legislature as a clear and authori-
tative check on the independence of the judiciary. 26 "Yet, even at the
outset, in some states the elective principle [was] obtained. Thus in New
Jersey, Virginia, and South Carolina the legislature elected the judges,
and Vermont and Tennessee when they became states in 1793 and 1796
each adopted the same practises [sic]"-a form of legislative appoint-
ment.27 In short, early state constitutions "put state courts very much
under the thumb of state legislatures. ''28
The appointive method has still not fallen entirely out of use.29 To-
day "proponents of the appointive method of selection and retention ar-
gue that it is the best means available to ensure the independence of
judges, because it insulates judges from periodically having to submit
themselves . . . to the electorate for approval. '30 However, "[t]he advan-
tage of the appointment process is, depending on one's ideology, also its
weakness. That is, the system promotes judicial independence by having
no substantial check on the judge after the confirmation process."'3' The
23 See generally AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDIC-
TION COURTS 3 (2004), http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts.pdf.
24 Learned Hand, The Elective and Appointive Methods of Selection of Judges, 3 EF-
CIENT Gov. 130, 130 (1913) ("When the colonies came to make their constitutions, they gener-
ally accepted such institutions as they were used to, and most of them provided for the
appointment of the judges").
25 Hanssen, supra note 17, at 442 (explaining that "[t]he legislature enjoyed the exclu-
sive right to choose judges in six states, shared those rights with the governor in seven others
(usually in the form of confirmation powers).").
26 Id. at 442-43 (This "check" was strengthened by the fact that "legislatures were not
hesitant to use th[eir] influence. In late eighteenth-century Rhode Island, supreme court jus-
tices who nullified a legislative act were called before the legislature to explain themselves and
were replaced by the legislature when their terms expired the following year.").
27 Hand, supra note 24, at 130.
28 Hanssen, supra note 17, at 441.
29 See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SociEry, supra note 23, at 3.
30 Webster, supra note 13, at 13-14.
31 Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas, 40 Sw. L.J.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 53, 58 (1986); see also Frederic M. Miller, Discipline of Judges, 50 MICH. L.
REv. 737, 737 (1952) ("In most of the states, judges of the appellate courts and of the trial
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appointive method has lost much of its former support, and most states
have now shifted to other methods. 32
B. THE JACKSONIAN ERA AND THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
A profound shift in the method of judicial selections occurred dur-
ing the presidency of Andrew Jackson, as "[t]he concept of an elected
judiciary emerged... as part of a larger movement aimed at democratiz-
ing the political process in America. '33  This "movement was
spearheaded by reformers who contended that the concept of an elite
judiciary . . . did not square with the ideology of a government under
popular control. ' 34 Interestingly, this shift can also be largely attributed
to erosion in the level of support legislatures had previously maintained
as "[a] growing dissatisfaction with legislative performance hastened a
shift in power. '35 These public desires fueled the "pressure to replace
appointive offices of all kinds" and to remove responsibility for judicial
selection from state legislatures and executive branches. 36 As a result,
although the first twenty-nine states provided for judicial appointment,
most states entering the Union during or after Jackson's presidency relied
on partisan election, and many state constitutions were rewritten to fur-
ther facilitate this shift.37 It should also be noted that this movement also
had a political element as "[t]he introduction of elections stood to benefit
those who had proved themselves adept at winning elections [in this in-
stance, Jackson's Democratic Party]," but regardless of the cause, selec-
tion methods were fundamentally reordered during this period.38 In
drawing upon the earlier pendulum analogy, this shift-driven by con-
courts of general jurisdiction are subject to discipline or removal from office by impeachment
at the hands of the legislature .... Such proceedings are seldom instituted.").
32 AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 23, at 3.
33 Hand, supra note 24, at 130. As Hand notes:
Georgia has the distinction, good or bad, of being in 1812 the first state to elect any
judges by vote of the people, though the change applied only to the inferior courts,
and it was not till twenty years later that Mississippi, in a burst of democratic enthu-
siasm, became the first state to elect all its judges by popular vote. Since that time
this method has been very generally extended.
Id.
34 DuBois, supra note 14, at 3; see also LARRY C. BERKSON & RACHEL CAUFIELD, JUDI-
CIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2005), http://www.ajs.org/js/berkson_2005.pdf.
35 Hanssen, supra note 17, at 445.
36 Id. at 446.
37 PRESSER ET AL., supra note 13, at 358; see also Hanssen, supra note 17, at 446; Niles,
The Popular Election of Judges in Historical Perspective, in THE RECORD OF THE AssocIA-
TION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 523, 526 (1966). ("The debates on an elective
judiciary were brief; there was apparently little need to discuss the abuses of the appointive
system, or its failures, or why election would be better. A few delegates argued cogently for
the retention of the old system, and indeed forecast the evils if the judiciary fell under political
domination .... But the spirit of reform carried the day.")
38 PRESSER ET AL., supra note 13, at 358.
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cerns over the independence of the judiciary-showcased a major swing
in favor of judicial accountability. In short, policymakers and contempo-
rary voters were willing to risk the politicization of the judiciary to en-
sure that judges were held accountable.
Despite the widespread use of partisan elections throughout the
nineteenth century, partisan election has been in a decades-long de-
cline.39 Today, "the principal argument of proponents is that partisan
election is the only method by which the accountability of judges can be
ensured" and that "judges, like legislators, make law and, therefore,
should be selected and retained in the same manner as are legislators. 40
Critics counter that requiring judicial candidates to campaign has an un-
seemly impact upon the tone and tenor of many state judiciaries.4' As a
result, more "balanced" selection methods have gained increasing ac-
ceptance in recent years. 42
C. THE SHIFT TOWARD NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS
By the end of the nineteenth century, weaknesses in the partisan
election model were already apparent and the need to further refine judi-
cial selections was clear.43 "The experience with partisan elections had
shown that an elected court, instead of being rendered independent of
incumbent politicians, simply became responsive to the same political
forces that dominated legislatures. '44 In 1878, "the American Bar Asso-
ciation came out strongly against partisan judicial elections on the
grounds that judges were subject to undue and damaging political pres-
sure."'45 The solution adopted in many states was to rely on nonpartisan
elections as many felt "[w]hat was necessary was to insulate judges"
from political pressures. 46 Nonpartisan elections attempt to isolate vot-
39 BERKSON & CAUFIELD, supra note 34, at 2.
40 Webster, supra note 13, at 17.
41 Phillips & Poll, supra note 10; Geyh, supra note 15, at 43.
42 BERKSON & CAUFIELD, supra note 34, at 3.
43 DuBOIS, supra note 14, at 7 (explaining Missouri Supreme Court Justice Fred Wil-
liams' view of his career in a partisan election state: "I was elected in 1916 because Woodrow
Wilson kept us out of war-I was defeated in 1920 because Woodrow Wilson hadn't kept us
out of war."); Ryan L. Souders, Note, A Gorilla at the Dinner Table: Partisan Judicial Elec-
tions in the United States, 25 REv. LrrG. 529, 544 (2006) (explaining state implementing
partisan election was no "panacea" for their problems with the judiciary); see also BERKSON &
CAUFIELD, supra note 34, at 2 (explaining that under partisan election "[t]he notion of a judici-
ary uncontrolled by special interests had simply not been realized. It was in this context that
the concept of nonpartisan elections began to emerge."); Marie A. Falinger, Can a Good Judge
Be a Politician? Judicial Elections from a Virtue Ethics Approach, 70 Mo. L. REV. 433
(2005).
44 Hanssen, supra note 17, at 450.
45 Id. at 450; see also LARRY C. BERKSON ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS 1, 4 (1981) (explaining that as early as 1873 Cook
County, Illinois removed information about party affiliations from the judicial election ballot).
46 Hanssen, supra note 17, at 450.
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE 351
ing decisions from party labels, as these voting cues can be misleading
and can be a "threat to public confidence in judicial neutrality. '47 In
creating and implementing this method, policymakers, for the first time,
attempted to fashion a crude balance between the recognized objectives
of accountability and independence.
Despite concerns about the effectiveness of this model-particularly
in limiting the politicization of elections, nonpartisan election quickly
became a popular alternative. 48 Current proponents of this method argue
that "such a system permits the people to retain their right to vote for
judges, while at the same time [the system also] reduc[es] the frequent
turnover on the bench that occurs in many partisan election states"-
which illustrates that some measure of independence may be obtained
through this method of selection.49 The main drawback to this approach
relates to how effectively the model is able to isolate judges from politi-
cal pressure-an open question in many jurisdictions and in the minds of
many commentators.50
D. THE RISE OF MERIT SELECTION
At the dawn of the twentieth century, merit selection was created in
order to strike a more appropriate balance between judicial accountabil-
ity and independence. 51 Many states had serious concerns with the other
methods as "[a]fter the Civil War ... one party began to dominate the
political process through mechanisms such as patronage politics and po-
litical machines. '' 52 Even the increased use of nonpartisan elections had
done little to alleviate these concerns.5 3 As a result, merit selection was
47 Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add Nonpartisan Judicial Elec-
tions, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1397, 1415 (2003).
48 AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 23, at 3.
49 Webster, supra note 13, at 25.
50 Schotland, supra note 47, at 1397; Martin I. Kaminsky, Available Compromises for
Continued Judicial Selection Reform, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 466, 490 (1979); see also BERK-
SON & CAUFIELD, supra note 34, at 3 ("As early as 1908 members of the South Dakota Bar
Association indicated dissatisfaction with how the idea was working in their state. By 1927,
Iowa, Kansas, and Pennsylvania had already tried the plan and abandoned it."). This source
also notes that "the major objection [to nonpartisan election] was that there was still no real
public choice. New candidates for judgeship were regularly selected by party leaders and
thrust upon an unknowledgeable electorate, which, without the guidance of party labels, was
not able to make reasoned choices." Id.
51 RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE
BAR 8-9 (1969) (explaining the organized bar's dissatisfaction with judicial elections).
52 Peter P. Olszweski, Sr., Who's Judging Whom? Why Popular Elections Are Prefera-
ble to Merit Selection Systems, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 1, 4 (2004).
53 Southwick, supra note 18, at 219 (explaining that "most commentators contend that,
far from being an improvement upon partisan elections, nonpartisan elections are an inferior
alternative to partisan elections because they possess all of the vices of partisan elections and
none of the virtues."); see also Schotland, supra note 47, at 1397-99 (explaining issues related
to nonpartisan election).
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the alternative developed by the era's judicial reformers. 54 Dean Roscoe
Pound, who famously made the argument for reform in a 1906 address to
the American Bar Association, is traditionally given credit for providing
the reform movement its early momentum.55 Pound's message was sim-
ple and clear: "Putting courts into politics and compelling judges to be-
come politicians, in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the
traditional respect for the Bench." 56 In 1913, Albert M. Kales, a law
professor at Northwestern University and Director of Research for the
American Judicature Society, built upon Pound's arguments and devel-
oped merit selection-which, although slightly modified through subse-
quent scholarship and practice, is still utilized to this day. 57
In 1940, Missouri became the first state to actually utilize this selec-
tion system (as a result, merit selection is commonly referred to as the
"Missouri Plan"). 58 Missouri passed this reform through popular refer-
endum as voters were concerned with the level of corruption within the
state judiciary, and focused on curbing the power of Kansas City's Pen-
dergast Machine. 59 Many states. soon adopted this reform; in fact, this
movement has had such vigor that over two-thirds of states now select at
least some judges through merit selection. 60
To understand how merit selection achieves a balance between ac-
countability and independence, one must first understand how a system
of merit selection typically operates. In general, merit selection utilizes
three main steps: 1) evaluation and selection of candidates by a state
nominating commission; 2) gubernatorial approval and selection of a
54 WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 51, at 82-83.
55 See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906); see also Hanssen, supra note 17, at 451-52; WATSON &
DOWNING, supra note 51, at 8. For another early condemnation of other forms of judicial
selection, see William H. Taft, The Selection and Tenure of Judges, 38 A.B.A. REP. 418
(1913).
56 See Pound, supra note 55, at 415.
57 See ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE
NOMINATING PROCESS II (1974) (explaining the creation of merit selection and the subsequent
modifications proposed by other scholars-such as substituting the governor as the official
making the final determination rather than the Chief Justice).
58 Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 2 (1994).
59 WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 51, at 82-83 (explaining the allocation of judicial
positions prior to the Missouri Plan and how "[t]his system came to an abrupt end with the
adoption of the Missouri Plan.").
60 Marsha Puro et al., An Analysis of Judicial Diffusion: Adoption of the Missouri Plan in
the American States, PUBLIUS, Fall 1985, at 85, 86; AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MERIT
SELECTION: THE BEST WAY TO CHOOSE JUDGES? 1, 3 (2005), http:/lwww.as.org/js/ms_
descrip.pdf. But see Seth Andersen, Examining the Decline in Support for Merit Selection, 67
ALB. L. REv. 793 (2004) (explaining the merit selection movement has lost some of its previ-
ous momentum).
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candidate; and 3) periodic retention elections. 6' The first step, evaluation
and selection of judicial candidates by a nominating committee, is vitally
important to the success of the process. 62 A judicial nominating commit-
tee operates as "a permanent nonpartisan commission of lawyers [and
laypersons] that initially and independently generates, screens and sub-
mits a list of judicial nominees to an official who is legally or voluntarily
bound to make a final selection from this list.' '63 Thus, the nominating
committee is charged with determining the relative "merit" of judicial
candidates-rather than the voting public-which provides judges a de-
gree of independence from the political environment. 64 Once the state
nominating commission has completed its task, the governor makes an
appointment based upon the committee's recommendations. 65 The can-
didate is then appointed to the judicial vacancy-typically for a rela-
tively short probationary period-after which the public can voice its
opinions on the judge's performance and qualifications in retention
elections. 66
This last step, holding regular retention elections, ensures that
judges remain accountable to the electorate-as these votes continue
even after the probationary period has passed.67 In practice, a retention
election operates as follows: "The sole question on which the electorate
votes is: 'Shall Judge __ be retained in office?' A judge must win a
majority of the vote in order to serve."'68 Some question the ability of
retention elections to maintain judicial accountability, but it is clear that
these votes do provide at least a limited role for public participation-a
role designed to allow for judicial accountability and to remove politics
from the selection calculus. 69
The balance struck between accountability and independence in
merit selection jurisdictions also has a structural impact on judicial politi-
cal speech. 70 In an elective system some degree of judicial political
61 WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 51, at 13-14.
62 ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 57, at 12 (explaining that the nominating commission
is "the cornerstone of this process."); see also WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 51, at 13-14.
63 ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 57, at 11; WATSON & DoWNING, supra note 51, at
13-14.
64 ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 57, at 60-69 (explaining the factors taken into account
when considering the qualifications of a candidate for judicial service-background factors,
professional skills, character, personality and motivations, and the opinions of interest groups
regarding the candidate's qualifications).
65 WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 51, at 14.
66 Id.
67 Id. (explaining that the judge serves a one- or two-year probationary period, after
which the judge runs unopposed on a retention ballot).
68 BERKSON & CAUFIELD, supra note 34, at 5
69 John M. Roll, Merit Selection: The Arizona Experience, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 837, 863-68
(1990).
70 See infra Part III.
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speech is appropriate in order to inform voters of the qualitative choices
presented at the ballot box-which directly relates to the system's pri-
mary goal of holding judges accountable. In this sense, the choice of the
elective system has fundamentally impacted the tenor of the campaigns
in these jurisdictions. In comparison, under an appointive system, where
independence is the primary goal, a judge would have little need or moti-
vation to discuss disputed legal issues. This distinction relates directly to
the role voters play within a merit system. In the latter case, a voter is
voting on the retention-not the selection-of a candidate. Selection is
carried out by the nonpolitical state nominating commission based on the
merit and qualifications of the candidates. As a result, although a voter
within a merit selection jurisdiction does have a need for information,
this information should be primarily focused on the judge's performance,
rather than political or personal views. Voters, then, only require infor-
mation relevant to their role as a procedural safeguard, and the incentives
behind undesirable judicial speech are limited.
II. JUDICIAL CANONS AND THE AFTERMATH OF
REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE
A traditional nonstructural alternative to regulating judicial political
speech has been to rely on ethical canons. Historically, ethical canons
have allowed jurisdictions to control the conduct of judicial candidates
throughout the selection process, particularly in elective systems where
candidates have the strongest incentive to campaign aggressively. 7' Of
particular relevance is Canon 5 of the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct, which regulates and restricts the political activities of judicial of-
ficers and candidates. 72 Lately, however, state provisions based on
Canon 5 have come under attack because many feel that this ethical obli-
gation infringes upon a judge's constitutional rights. 73 Several success-
ful lawsuits have, at least arguably, eroded the viability of this ethical
barrier. 4 To fully understand the effect of recent legal challenges on the
overall field of judicial selections, it is necessary to understand the devel-
opment of the canons, the impact of the Court's decision in White, as
well as the general contours of the post-White landscape.
71 JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHics § 11.01 (3d ed. 2000).
72 Id.
73 See James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Woudenberg, An Announce Clause by Any Other Name:
The Unconstitutionality of Disciplining Judges Who Fail to Disqualify for Exercising Their
Freedom to Speak, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 723 (2007); Terry Carter, The Big Bopper, A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 2006, at 31 (detailing Mr. James Bopp's efforts in attacking judicial canons in many
states). See generally Plymouth Nelson, Don't Rock the Boat: Minnesota's Canon 5 Keeps
Incumbents High and Dry While Voters Flounder in a Sea of Ignorance, 28 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1607 (2002).
74 See Phillips & Poll, supra note 10 (explaining the litigation at the circuit court level in
the aftermath of White); see also Carter, supra note 73, at 31.
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A. THE PRE- WHITE WORLD
The earliest judicial canons developed as a method of defining the
parameters of acceptable judicial conduct, thus helping to preserve the
oft-mentioned balance between judicial accountability and indepen-
dence.75 Ethical canons governing the conduct of lawyers were devel-
oped at the turn of the century by the American Bar Association (ABA)
(although the first three attempts to implement its provisions in 1908,
1909, and 1917 all failed). 76 In 1922, Chief Justice William H. Taft
chaired a commission charged with the development of similar ethical
guidelines for judicial officers which were eventually adopted by the
ABA in 1924. 77 Nearly all states have now adopted some variant of the
ABA model canons, and the ABA periodically revisits these strictures to
adjust to court decisions and perceived shortcomings. 78 The 1990 Model
Code revisions specifically addressed issues of judicial conduct, particu-
larly within the context of judicial elections. 79 Canon 5(A) provided that
a judge or judicial candidate may not act as a leader within a political
organization, publicly endorse or oppose any candidates' campaign for
political office, make speeches on behalf of a candidate, attend political
gatherings, solicit funds, or make contributions to political campaigns or
organizations. 80 Canon 5(C), however, modified this restriction for juris-
dictions utilizing partisan judicial elections-a recognition that such
elections are markedly different-and provided an additional list of ac-
75 SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 71, § 11.01.
76 A.B.A. Joint Comm'n to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Background
Paper, http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/about/background.html (last visited Feb. 11,
2008).
77 Id. Interestingly, the motivation for this model code was the conduct of United States
District Court Judge Kennesaw Mountain Landis who was hired as Commissioner of Base-
ball-drawing a salary almost five times greater than his judicial compensation for this task-
and yet remained on the federal bench). Id.
78 SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 71, § 11.01; Peter A. Joy, A Professionalism Creed for
Judges: Leading by Example, 52 S.C. L. REV. 667, 692 (2001) (explaining that all states-
with the exception of Montana-have adopted some form of judicial canons); see also White,
536 U.S. at 786 (noting that states, however, did not adopt these provisions quickly and have
not always implemented all of the provisions recommended by the ABA); Peter A. Joy, A
Professionalism Creed for Judges: Leading by Example, 52 S.C. L. REV. 667, 692 (2001)
(explaining that all states-with the exception of Montana-have adopted some form of judi-
cial canons).
79 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 5 (1990); see also SHAMAN ET AL.,
§ 11.02 (discussing additional restrictions on judicial campaign conduct imposed under the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility).
80 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 5(A) (1990). These activities include:
purchasing tickets to and attending political events, contributing to political organizations,
identifying oneself as a member of a political party, speaking at political rallies on one's own
behalf, and publicly endorsing or opposing other candidates for the same judicial office for
which the candidate is campaigning. Id.
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tivities in which a judge or a candidate for judicial office may engage. 8t
It is clear that the intention of these provisions was to limit the politiciza-
tion of judicial campaigns while allowing states to maintain their respec-
tive choice of selection method.
B. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE
Against this restrictive ethical backdrop, in 2002 Gregory Wersal
challenged Minnesota's Code of Judicial Conduct.82 Wersal, a candidate
for Minnesota's Supreme Court,83 challenged Minnesota's announce
clause, which prohibited judicial candidates from announcing their views
on disputed legal or political issues.84 Wersal had made several public
statements regarding decisions of the current court and had also dis-
cussed his views on constitutional interpretation and disputed issues such
as abortion and crime control.8 5 After a complaint was registered with
the state's ethics board, Wersal withdrew from the election fearing ethi-
cal sanction, only to announce a new campaign for the state's highest
court several months later.86 Before beginning this second campaign,
Wersal sought an advisory opinion from the State Lawyers Board asking
whether the announce clause and other judicial canons would be en-
forced.87 The State Lawyers Board could only provide a vague opinion
as Wersal did not actually detail what he intended to say; this led to
further legal challenge. 88 Eventually, the challenge wound its way to the
Supreme Court where, in a sharply divided decision, the Court found
Minnesota's announce clause unconstitutional. 89 Two opinions are par-
81 SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 71, § 11.04. These activities include: purchasing tickets
for political gatherings, making contributions to political organizations, identifying oneself as
a member of a political organization or party, speaking at political gatherings on one's own
behalf, and publicly endorsing or opposing other candidates for the same judicial office for
which the candidate is running. Id.
82 Republican Party Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). See generally SHAMAN
ET AL., supra note 71, § I 1.04. It is important to note, however, that the announce clause
challenged in this case was not widely applied in state practice and its questionable constitu-
tionally was recognized by even the ABA as the 1990 revisions to the Model Code dropped
this provision. See Briffault, supra note 11, at 203; see also Kevin S. Burke, An Opportunity
for Leadership Is Lost, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 611 (2007) (explaining the development of Minne-
sota's judicial canons and subsequent litigation).
83 See Burke, supra note 82.
84 White, 536 U.S. at 786; see also MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucr, Canon
5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000).
85 Layman, supra note 20, at 771.
86 David Neil McCarty, Note, Walk Before They Make Us Run: Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White and the Need for Judicial Reform in Mississippi, 23 Miss. C. L. REV. 5 1,
52-53 (2003).
87 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F. 3d 854, 859 (8th Cir. 2001).
88 Id.
89 White, 536 U.S. at 765. This case actually produced five separate opinions: Justice
Scalia's majority opinion, concurring opinions by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, and dis-
sents from Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. Id.; see also Layman, supra note 20, at 771 (ex-
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ticularly relevant to this Article: Scalia's majority opinion and
O'Connor's concurrence.
1. Scalia's Majority Opinion
Scalia's majority opinion found that strict scrutiny, the standard of
review reserved for fundamental rights, applied to this restraint on politi-
cal speech. 90 As a result, Minnesota needed to prove that its announce
clause was narrowly tailored toward obtaining a compelling state inter-
est.91 Minnesota argued that the state's goal of preserving an impartial
judiciary should qualify as a compelling state interest. 92 Scalia however,
found that Minnesota's interest in maintaining an impartial judiciary
failed to save the announce clause.93
To support this conclusion the majority analyzed three possible def-
initions of "impartiality. '94 According to Scalia, -one possible definition
is a "lack of bias for or against any party to the proceeding. ' 95 Using this
definition, Scalia found Minnesota's announce clause was not narrowly
tailored because the provision "does not restrict speech for or against
particular parties, but rather speech for particular issues," and as a result,
there is no actual bias present. 96 Scalia next considered impartiality's
usage within the judicial context-the "lack of preconception in favor or
against a particular legal view."'97 In the majority's view, this definition
also failed to provide a compelling state interest as "[a] judge's lack of
predisposition regarding the issues in a case has never been thought a
necessary component of equal justice. '98 Scalia noted the utter impossi-
bility of finding competent judges lacking any preconceived ideas re-
garding any topics related to legal doctrine. 99 Last, Scalia considered a
general definition of impartiality connoting "open-mindedness," which,
to Scalia, required that a judge be willing "to consider views that oppose
plaining that the Republican Party of Minnesota joined this case "arguing that its ability to
assess a candidate was harmed by the prohibition of [judicial campaign] speech.").
90 White, 536 U.S. at 774-75.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 775 (citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214
(1989)).
93 See id. at 776 & 776 n.6 (discussing that although impartiality was offered as a com-
pelling state interest, both Minnesota and the lower courts failed to give this term definition).
94 See id. at 775-80.
95 Id. at 775.
96 Id. But see Brendan H. Chandonnet, The Increasing Politicization of the American
Judiciary: Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and Its Effects on Future Judicial Selection
in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 577, 585 (2004) ("If a judge does announce his
views on a legal issue he clearly does have a bias-a bias against all parties that present cases
contrary to that position, regardless of a fact in the case.").
97 White, 536 U.S. at 777.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 777-78.
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his preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise
in a particular case.' 1°° Even this important purpose, however, failed to
save the announce clause as the provision was not actually adopted for
this end.101 As a result, the Supreme Court struck down Minnesota's
announce clause as an unconstitutional restraint on the First Amendment
rights of judges. 10 2 As Scalia succinctly summarized:
[T]he greater power to dispense with elections altogether
does not include the lesser power to conduct elections
under conditions of state-imposed voter ignorance. If
the State chooses to tap the energy and legitimizing
power of the democratic process, it must accord the par-
ticipants in that process ... the First Amendment rights
that attach to their roles. 103
Scalia also explained the tensions between the judicial canons and
First Amendment jurisprudence as "perhaps unsurprising, since the
ABA, which originated the announce clause, has long been an opponent
of judicial elections," 1°4 and that "this practice [of creating judicial ca-
nons] relatively new to judicial elections and still not universally
adopted, does not compare well with the traditions deemed worthy of our
attention.' 0 5 The net effect of this opinion may be to give voice to the
Court's concerns regarding the constitutionality of many of the remain-
ing judicial canons, although this remains an open question. 10 6
2. O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
Going beyond Scalia's First Amendment analysis, Justice O'Connor
directly focused on the structural impact of judicial selection methods.' 0 7
In O'Connor's view, attempts to use judicial canons to promote judicial
impartiality are constitutionally suspect. 1° 8 O'Connor made it patently
clear that judicial candidates "cannot help being aware that if the public
is not satisfied with the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt their
reelection prospects,"' 1 9 and that "relying on campaign contributions
may leave judges feeling indebted to certain parties or interest groups
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 788.
103 Id. (citing Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
104 Id. at 787.
105 Id. at 786.
106 Developments in the Law-Voting and Democracy, Judicial Elections and Free
Speech, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1134 (2006) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
107 See White, 536 U.S. at 786.
108 See id. at 788-89 ("But if judges are subject to regular elections they are likely to feel
that they have at least some personal stake in the outcome of every publicized case.").
109 Id. at 789.
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[and] the mere possibility that judges' decisions may be motivated by the
desire to repay campaign contributors is likely to undermine the public's
confidence in the judiciary."'1 0 O'Connor also noted the role of reforms
in the area of judicial selections (including the Missouri Plan) in promot-
ing judicial independence and impartiality and concluded that "[t]his sys-
tem obviously reduces threats to judicial impartiality, even if it does not
eliminate all popular pressure on judges."'l1 According to O'Connor,
the canons are not the best means of preserving judicial independence
and impartiality; rather, this is an objective which should be fostered
structurally though methods of judicial selection actually designed to
achieve these goals. 12
C. THE POST- WHITE LANDSCAPE
State ethics boards, interest groups, and lower courts have thus far
disagreed on how to actually quantify White's impact. 1 3 The initial im-
pact of the holding has been quite limited; although White plainly held
Minnesota's "announce clause" unconstitutional, only nine states re-
tained similar provisions because their constitutionality had long been
suspect." 14 White "specifically sidestepped [addressing] any of the other
provisions included in Minnesota's Code of Judicial Conduct, including
the 'commit' clause, the 'pledges or promises' clause, and restrictions on
candidates' solicitation on campaign funds."'" 5 As a result, there has
been abundance of debate on White's downstream impact on the remain-
ing canons:' 16
The White line of cases has reopened major questions of
institutional design that once seemed settled. States
have pared back candidate speech restrictions, political
parties and interest groups have entered the fray as never
I I Id. at 789-90; see also David Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the
Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 379-80 (describing anecdotal
evidence from lawyers suspecting their donations to judicial campaigns might impact their
courtroom efforts).
1 1 White, 536 U.S. at 791.
112 See id. at 792.
113 See Cynthia Gray, The Good News in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 87
JUDICATURE 271 (2004) [herinafter Gray, Good News] (stating that "[t]he states' reactions have
ranged from capitulation out of a fear of being sued, giving up any attempt to require judicial
candidates to campaign differently for other offices.... to continuing enforcement of narrower
restrictions believing that the principles of judicial impartiality and independence should apply
even to an elected judiciary"); see also Cynthia Gray, The States' Response to Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, 86 JUDICATURE 163 (2002) [hereinafter Gray, States' Response].
114 See Gray, Good News, supra note 113, at 163.
' 15 Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States Are Responding to Republi-
can Party of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Campaign Elections Are Changing, 38
Akron L. Rev. 625, 639 (2006).
116 See generally id. at 639.
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before, and judicial candidates have shown a new will-
ingness to engage in campaign strategies like attack ad-
vertising that were once largely confined to legislative
and executive races."l 7
A brief analysis of these diverse reactions to White can provide in-
sight into the future viability of the remaining judicial canons.
1. State Responses
Although states responded very differently to White, most states
"began to review limitations on free speech during judicial campaigns as
prescribed in state judicial conduct codes." ' 18 Several states have issued
broad statements affirming the validity of their state judicial canons, in-
cluding Georgia, which stated that "going forward in this election season,
the Commission will be vigilant" in enforcing the ethical canons." 19
Other states have taken a more cautious approach, indicating that while
they will continue to enforce the canons, the state will more narrowly
interpret the provisions.' 20 Alabama recently took this approach and
withdrew an advisory opinion that suggested judges not respond to judi-
cial surveys out of concern that the opinion may violate the post-White
standards.' 2 ' Other states have taken more extreme action. "Among the
most drastic alterations of a state code, North Carolina changed its code
to repeal the 'pledges or promises' clause and to allow candidates greater
freedom to endorse other candidates and directly seek campaign contri-
butions." 122 Minnesota's reaction, however, is perhaps the most interest-
ing. Minnesota, long the epicenter of this debate, established a
commission to evaluate the state's remaining options shortly after the
White holding. 23 This commission recently released its recommenda-
117 Developments in the Law, supra note 106, at 1140.
118 Ferris K. Nesheiwat, Judicial Restraint: Resolving the Constitutional Tension Between
First Amendment Protection of Political Speech and the Compelling Interest in Preserving
Judicial Integrity During Judicial Elections, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 757, 789 (2006); see also
Caufield, supra note 115, at 645-46 (explaining other possible state responses-including the
creation of advisory boards to advise judicial candidates, establishing looser canons with
tighter recusal standards, public financing of judicial elections, and shifting selection
methods).119 See Gray, States' Response, supra note 113, at 163-65 (stating that Georgia, Florida,
Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, and Ohio have also issued statements to this effect).
120 See id.
121 See id.; see also Alabama Advisory Opinion 00-763 (2003).
122 Caufield, supra note 115, at 645-46. North Carolina's approach is interesting in that
the state has also elected to implement public financing of its judicial campaigns-"an alterna-
tive [which the state hopes will] preserve democratic accountability in the judiciary but elimi-
nate the worst effects by limiting the influence of campaign contributions by special interests."
Id. at 646.
123 Dane Smith, Change Is Likely in Judges' Selection, STAR Tam. (St. Paul), Feb. 19,
2007, at I.
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tions and advocated a structural change toward merit selection to avoid
"the judicial-election excesses noted elsewhere."' 124 In the end, only one
thing is clear from these divergent state responses-consensus on
White's impact has yet to materialize at the state level.
2. Organizational Views
Private organizations have also diverged in their assessment of
White largely based upon institutional objectives. For example, the Na-
tional Center for State Courts issued guidance explaining the narrowness
of the White holding and stressing that the actual opinion addresses the
constitutionality of only the announce clause.1 25 This organization fur-
ther asserted that the Court did not intend this decision to have any im-
pact the pledges or promises clause, the partisan activities clause, and the
commit clause under the ABA Model Rules. 126 Other organizations,
however, have taken an alternative view of the holding and have utilized
the White decision to distribute judicial surveys. 127 These organizations
argue that in a post-White world, judges are allowed to answer such
questionnaires, expressing the view that "to stop a judge from answering
would be illegal."'' 28
3. The Lower Courts Respond
Courts have also split on the issue of White's impact. 129 Although
Scalia made clear that White "neither assert[ed] nor [implied] that the
First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the
same as those for legislative office," he provided no guidance on how to
draw this distinction.130 A recent influential article focusing on develop-
ments in this area argues that future case law will hinge upon how courts
address three interconnected issues: 1) whether strict scrutiny truly ap-
124 Conrad deFiebre, Retention Elections Proposed for Judges, STAR TRIB. (St. Paul),
Feb. 21, 2007, at 4B.
125 NAT'L AD Hoc ADVISORY COMM. ON JUDICIAL ELECTION LAW, REPUBLICAN PARTY
OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE and the Canons Regulating Judicial Elections 1 (2002), http://www.
judicialcampaignconduct.org/ElectionLawWhiteMemo.pdf.
126 Id. at 2-3.
127 See Caufield, supra note 115, at 641 (explaining the views of Kentucky's Family
Trust Foundation-"The current powers that be in Kentucky place restrictions on what a judi-
cial candidate can say, which, in other worlds limits their free speech .... and that, in turn,
limits the knowledge the voters need to make a wise decision."); see also IOWANS CONCERNED
ABOUT JUDGES, 2006 JUDICIAL VOTERS GUIDE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL CANDIDATES
(2006), http://www.iowansconcernedaboutjudges.com/doc/Survey.pdf; FAMILY ACTION COUN-
CIL OF TENNESSEE, supra note 9.
128 See, e.g., IOWANS CONCERNED ABOUT JUDGES, supra note 127.
129 Developments in the Law, supra note 106, at 1134 (explaining that "White perplexed
courts (and candidates) across the nation.").
130 Id. (citing Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002)).
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plies to judicial canons;13' 2) how courts define "impartiality"; 132 and 3)
whether recusal can serve as an effective remedy (for example, can a
judge provide their views several issues but recuse themselves every time
one of those issues arises?). 133 At least one court, however, has already
upheld a canon against a constitutional challenge in the post-White
era. 134 In In re Raab, New York's "pledges and promises clause" was
challenged in light of the White holding. 135 In upholding the canon, the
New York Court of Appeals rejected this argument, finding that while
the restriction did merit the application of strict scrutiny, the canon was
sufficiently distinct from the announce clause in White to pass constitu-
tional muster. 136
On the other hand, many commentators argue that although White
stated that a distinction remains between races for political and judicial
office, in actuality, no true boundary remains. 137 This thesis has been
born out by many of the subsequent legal challenges which continue to
be considered by the courts.' 38 Three recent cases provide a representa-
tive sample of the ongoing litigation in this area.
In Weaver v. Bonner, the Eleventh Circuit considered the constitu-
tionality of several provisions under Georgia's Code of Judicial Con-
duct.139 In this case, Georgia's Special Committee on Judicial Election
sanctioned a judicial candidate for an advertisement discussing his oppo-
nent's viewpoints; the advertisement in question arguably violated a pro-
hibition on "making false and misleading statements."'140 The Eleventh
Circuit found that the provision and related sanction were unconstitu-
tional in light of the White decision. 141 The Eleventh Circuit, in fact,
131 Id. at 1141 (explaining that strict scrutiny may not be the proper standard for evaluat-
ing judicial canons-particularly those beyond the announce clause in White).
132 Id.
133 Id.; see also Caufield, supra note 115, at 639-44 (explaining such an approach was
specifically proposed in Kennedy's concurrence to White). Compare Phillips & Poll, supra
note 10, at 707 (advocating recusal as a possible solution to judicial speech issues), with Bopp
& Woudenberg, supra note 73, at 724 (arguing against the recusal proposal).
134 In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003); see also In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla.
2003) (upholding canons prohibiting Florida's "pledges and promises clause" and "commit
clause").
135 In re Raab, at 1289.
136 Id. at 1290.
137 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial Candidates Are Un-
constitutional, 35 IND. L. Rev. 735 (2002) (stating that "the First Amendment protects [judges]
right to express their views.").
138 See also Ross G. Currie, The End of Nonpartisan Judicial Elections and the Rise of
the Politicary: The Eighth Circuit Strikes Down Judicial Campaign Regulations in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, 51 VILL. L. REv. 665, 673-74 (2006); Caufield, supra note 115,
at 639-44.
139 Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11 th Cir. 2002).
140 Id. at 1316.
141 Id. at 1319.
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even expressed its doubts that any difference truly remains between judi-
cial and political elections after White. 142 In a similar holding, a New
York district court in Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial
Conduct found that a state canon regulating judicial political conduct was
overbroad. 143 As a result, a sanction imposed upon a judicial candidate
under the canon was also invalidated. 144
More recently, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (White II)
addressed, on remand, the constitutionality of the state's remaining judi-
cial canons after the Court's White decision-the partisan activities
(prohibiting activity within political organizations) and the solicitation
(prohibiting the personal solicitation of campaign contributions) clauses
of Minnesota's Code of Judicial Conduct. 145 The Eighth Circuit fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's lead in applying strict scrutiny to find these
provisions unconstitutional. 146 The Eighth Circuit found that the prof-
fered interest of maintaining an impartial and independent judiciary
could potentially be a compelling interest, but the prohibition was still
unconstitutional as it was not narrowly tailored to this end. 147
Although the case law in this area has yet to settle, most commenta-
tors have noted that "[i]n all likelihood, lower courts will continue to
deregulate judicial election speech; [and that] few trends point in the
other direction."' 148 As a result, the deregulation of judicial campaign
speech appears somewhat inevitable, and attempts to reformulate the ju-
dicial canons by the ABA may be for naught. 149
4. ABA's Reaction-Reworking the Model Canons?
The ABA Working Group on the First Amendment and Judicial
Campaigns has been working to develop a revised set of model judicial
canons to adapt to the changing legal climate in this area. 150 In 2003:
Following White, the ABA concluded that ... [the cur-
rent] speech restrictions were vulnerable to further First
Amendment attacks, and [as a result], adopted major re-
visions to the Model Code's campaign provisions. The
142 Id. at 1321.
143 Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y.
2003).
144 Id. at 92.
145 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (White 11), 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) (en
banc).
146 Id. at 744; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 106, at 1134.
147 White II, at 754-56.
148 Developments in the Law, supra note 106, at 1143.
149 Caufield, supra note 115, at 645 (explaining that [i]n light of White and cases
spawned by White, states will be in a continual state of uncertainty regarding the constitution-
ality of their speech restrictions.").
150 Gray, States' Response, supra note 113, at 163.
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revisions to Canon 5 eliminate the commitments clause
by folding it into the "promises clause," and attempt to
narrow the combined restriction's scope by limiting its
application only to certain "pledges, promises, or
commitments."151
Additionally, the revisions "for the first time in a century mandated,
in certain instances, the disqualification of an elected judge based on her
campaign statements."' 152 This greatly expanded the scope of this clause
and "attempt[ed] to accomplish what amounts to an end-run around
White.' 53 Even these changes may not be sufficient. Additional modifi-
cations are being evaluated at the ABA's mid-year meeting in an attempt
to respond to the post-White conditions. 54
At this juncture, it is very difficult to precisely chart the future of
the judicial canons-but it does not seem likely that the canons will con-
tinue to play a predominant role in the regulation of future judicial cam-
paigns. 155 In fact, if the current trend of deregulation continues, no
restrictions on the speech of judicial candidates may remain. 156 In such
instance, if a state is truly concerned with controlling the tenor of judicial
selections elective systems may not remain a viable option. As a result,
merit selection's ability to preserve the societal balance between ac-
countability and independence and to depoliticize the voter's role may be
the only answer to the problems states face in White's aftermath. 57
III. WHAT INFORMATION SHOULD A JUDGE PROVIDE IN
THE MERIT SELECTION CONTEXT AFTER WHITE?
While White recognized the need for the public to be an informed
participant in the selection of judges, it did not address the larger ques-
151 Matthew J. Medina, Note, The Constitutionality of the 2003 Revisions to Canon 3(E)
of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1081 (2004).
152 Id. at 1072-73.
153 Id. (explaining that the 2003 revisions required that judges disqualify themselves
"where a judge or judicial candidate makes 'any public statement that commits, or appears to
commit, the judge with respect to an 'issue' or 'controversy' in a particular case.").
154 Press Release, Am. Judicature Society, ABA to Adopt AJS Proposal to Strengthen
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, http://www.ajs.org/ajs/publications/Judicatories/2007Febru-
ary/modelcode.asp (explaining that most of the revisions related to the non-White issues-but
that the "ABA also held the ground against arguments that restrictions on judges' political
conduct cannot be justified after Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, rejecting efforts to
eliminate almost all restrictions on the political and campaign conduct of all judges, even those
who are not elected.").
155 See Brian Morris, Free Speech in Judicial Elections, 27 MoNT. L. REV. 5 (2002).
156 See generally Maria N. Greenstein, The New Right to Judicial Free Speech: A New
Threat to Judicial Independence, 42 JUDGES' J. 34 (2002).
157 But see Lambert, supra note 14, at 8 (arguing for nonstructural reform as "[w]hatever
views to the contrary policymakers and well-meaning citizens may have, judicial elections are
here to stay, and we must make the best of the system we have.").
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tion of what information voters should actually possess. An examination
of the informed voter concept, however, is crucial to unlocking the an-
swer to many of the post-White concerns. Additionally, an examination
of this concept may provide a platform from which voters can gain ac-
cess to information that will allow them to meaningfully participate in
the selection process. More importantly, however, it will allow the indi-
vidual to be the kind of informed voter contemplated by the particular
selection or retention process in which they participate.
The primary rationale of White is clear. If a state gives the public a
role in the selection of judges, it cannot then impose restrictions that
deprive the public of information needed to be an informed voter. This
need for the voter to be informed gives rise to the right of judges to
inform. Implicit in the White holding is that the information at issue is
part of the checklist of an informed voter. While some types of informa-
tion may be suitable for an individual voter in an elective process con-
templated by the Court in White, the concept of an informed voter may
change based on the nature of the particular voting process. Thus, an
informed voter may require different information under different selec-
tion and retention systems.
White did not specifically address the concept of an informed voter,
nor did it examine the proposition that the personal, legal, and political
views of judges are relevant voter information because they tend to influ-
ence judicial decision-making. Yet, while White did not explicitly weigh
in on this proposition, it has been the subject of longstanding legal and
political debates.
Many judges express the popular notion that personal views do not
play a role in formal judicial decision-making and that those charged
with the responsibility to help select judges do not need to be concerned
about the personal views of judges. Chief Justice John Roberts ex-
pressed this belief at his Senate confirmation hearings in 2005, in ex-
plaining his refusal to explain his personal views on a number of
issues.' 58 Under this view, judicial decisions are merely a product of a
subculture where judges rely on deductive reasoning based on estab-
lished legal principles. 59
158 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 178 (2005).
159 ROBERT A. CARP ET A.., JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 290-96 (7th ed. 2007)
(describing the subculture of legal reasoning); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
179, 181 (1987) (describing "the use of deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case from
premises accepted as authoritative").
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Other judges and legal scholars have found this proposition to be a
myth. 160 While judicial decision-making primarily involves the process
of legal reasoning, research shows the presence of a second influential
component that explains the basis for judicial decisions in those close
cases where no precedent is available to direct the final outcome.16' In
those instances, a judge's personal views and background inevitably seep
into the decision-making process. 162 This is not a new concept. Well
over a century ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. expressed the
same concept when he penned his venerable phrase, "The life of the law
has not been logic; it has been experience."' 63 Within that phrase, he
captured the notion that "[t]he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent
moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or un-
conscious, even the prejudices which judges share in their fellow-men
have had a good deal more to do than syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be govemed."' 64 While Holmes exposed this sub-
tle component of decision-making as "the secret root from which the law
draws all the juices of life," he also acknowledged it was something
"judges most rarely mention, and always with an apology."' 165
The Roberts-Holmes dichotomy can be viewed both as a solution to
the concerns of White and as support for its rationale. By eliminating
personal views of judges as a selection criterion, the Roberts approach
actually undermines the rationale in White for removing restrictions on
the speech of judicial candidates. If the personal views of judges are not
a part of the judicial decision-making process, then the voter does not
require this information. In other words, under the Roberts approach
there is no impetus to release the information to the voter in the first
place.
The Holmes' approach can be viewed to support the proposition that
the personal views of judges would be relevant within the context of an
unrestrained selection process. The impact of personal views in the deci-
sion-making process is clearly supported by research that has consist-
ently shown a relationship between the political party affiliation of a
judge and the outcome of many types of judicial decisions. 166 In the end
many factors play a role in judicial decision-making. The personal views
160 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's Clothes: Recognizing the Reality
of Constitutional Decision-Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1070-72 (2006).
161 See generally RICHARD J. RICHARDSON & KENNETH N. VINES, THE POLITICS OF FED-
ERAL COURTS (1970) (an empirical study of politics and decision making in the federal district
courts).
162 Id.
163 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 35.
166 CARP ET AL., supra note 159, at 297-304.
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of a judge tend to surface by necessity when formal legal reasoning fails
to produce a clear decision. In these cases, judges fall back on their
personal views to color in the shades of gray and paint the ultimate
conclusion.167
While the debate over whether the personal views of a judge actu-
ally play a role in judicial decisions is best resolved by clear analysis of
the empirical evidence, it is only a preliminary question to the larger
debate: whether personal views, regardless of whether they influence de-
cision-making, should be a criterion upon which to select judges. The
type of system used to select judges in the respective jurisdiction usually
determines this larger debate. If the public has open authority to select a
judge in an elective system, then the public is free to consider any and all
factors, in the same way as the President is free to nominate federal
judges, subject to Senate approval. In this way, a voter may want to
know the personal views of judges so the voter can vote for the candidate
perceived to be of like mind. The elective process actually contemplates
this will occur. Yet, the debate is decidedly different in those states
utilizing merit selection.
The purpose of merit selection is to remove judges from the politi-
cal process; the criteria for a candidate's nomination must be tied solely
to merit, or professional competence, with no consideration given to "po-
litical affiliation."' 68 Other than acting as representatives on state nomi-
nating commissions, the public plays no direct role either in the
nomination or selection of judges. The retention vote serves as an insti-
tutional safeguard-similar to the democratic system of checks and bal-
ances found throughout the nation's democratic institutions. Although
judges are accountable to both the law and codes of judicial conduct
(when and if applicable), under merit selection they are also accountable
to the public. Yet there is nothing to suggest that the apolitical process
of selecting judges under a merit selection process ends after appoint-
ment to the bench or that politics returns to the accountability component
after appointment. As a result, the adoption of merit selection by a state
is a clear public expression of the concept that the judicial system is best
served when judges are removed from the political arena. Injecting polit-
ics into a retention election contradicts this expression. Instead, reten-
tion, when properly viewed, should only be seen as a means for the
public to remove judges who have failed to live up to their performance-
based expectations. Those who select a judge can only forecast how a
candidate will translate into a judge. A retention voter can look back and
consider the judge's actual performance on the bench.
167 See id. at 319-26.
168 See generally IOWA CODE § 46.14 (2007).
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Accordingly, the adoption of merit selection is a giant step towards
eliminating any need for a retention voter to know the personal views of
a judge, and, in turn, the need for a judge to exercise the right to express
personal views on political and legal issues. Information relevant to a
retention election relates to professional competency and performance on
the bench. Yet, the narrowed scope of the retention process does not
totally solve the post-White concerns; it does not completely remove the
personal views of a judge as a subject of voter interest or concern. Just
as in a pre-White world, the personal views of judges and voters occa-
sionally muddy the process, and can even serve to undermine the merit
selection process.
First, a judge could make his or her personal views a topic of legiti-
mate public interest by using them to improperly decide cases in the face
of clear contrary law. This is actually a professional competency issue,
however, and is best flushed out by the appellate or disciplinary
processes, before it can become legitimate voter information. Addition-
ally, this can be a complex issue requiring carefully reasoned legal analy-
sis. As a result, voter knowledge of the content of the personal view at
issue is not the focus. Instead, the focus is the use of personal views in
the face of contrary legal principles.
Second, a voter can make the personal, political, and legal views of
a judge a retention issue by attacking a judge for deciding a case contrary
to a voter's personal views. While a voter has the freedom to take this
approach, this is a hypocritical misuse of the checks and balances power
given to the public. Just as the personal views of a judge should not
drive the judicial decision-making process, the personal views of the
voter also should not be a focus in retention elections. Both views are
inappropriate as a driving mechanism for judicial decisions because no
individual's view-either judge or voter-is above the law.
Third, a group or organization can also attempt to inject the personal
views of a judge into a retention election by labeling a judge's decision
or group of decisions in a politically charged manner. This practice too
should have no place in a retention election for the same reasons as an
individual who attacks a judge for deciding a case contrary to the per-
sonal views of the voter.
The last two circumstances can be very damaging to the merit selec-
tion process. 169 Large scale participation at this level undermines the
foundation of the process by transforming the retention vote into the very
process sought to be eliminated by merit selection. Yet, it is important to
observe that the responsibility given to the public to participate in the
169 See, e.g., Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of
Judicial Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1057 (2002).
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retention process at least impliedly imposes a responsibility on voters to
act and think differently than where they participate in a general partisan
election. Without public allegiance to the separation of the two separate
and distinct voting roles, merit selection in a politically charged society
risks failure. The problem is that this important characteristic of merit
selection was never expressly implemented into the merit selection
model. Thus, targeted campaigns that demand allegiance to certain polit-
ical and social views by judges on the retention ballot have surfaced for
two reasons. First, the process has not educated the public about its role
as a retention voter. Second the process is subject to the inherent short-
comings of human nature.
It is one thing to point out how a voter or political action group
interferes with the proper function of the checks and balances of a selec-
tion system by injecting irrelevant considerations into the process, but
experience demonstrates the difficulty of persuading either camp other-
wise. Actually achieving any degree of separation is another issue en-
tirely. In a merit selection state the need for a judge to discuss his or her
personal views on political or legal issues ought to be mostly limited to
those instances where the public misuses the retention process and
utilizes personal views as voting criterion. In such as situation, the White
decision serves a helpful purpose by giving a judge the right to fight
back. Additionally, the judge's very response to an attack may provide
the voting public another basis to assess the judge's temperament and
qualifications for the position. To give one example, a judge who re-
sponds to a political attack in an unprofessional manner demonstrates to
voters that the judge lacks the temperament necessary for continued ser-
vice on the bench. Yet, the preferred solution may not be found in re-
sponding to voters in a retention election. While the public has the
prerogative to engage in this rhetoric, the ultimate solution lies in educat-
ing the public about the role of the retention voter, and about the criteria
and information that retention voters should consider. Two shortcomings
of the merit selection process are that, in most instances, the system has
failed to include a component to educate the voter on its role in the reten-
tion process and it has failed to provide the information necessary for the
public to make informed decisions on individual judges. Without these
components, it is understandable that the public has looked to traditional
voting factors like personal views when making retention votes.
A. INFORMATION EXPLAINING How MERIT SELECTION OPERATES
A vital corollary to the informed voter concept within merit systems
is the public must be educated that such votes are of a considerably dif-
ferent character and quantum than elections within the standard political
context. Retention votes are not merely a case of picking between prof-
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fered candidates. The vote, in reality, operates as a referendum on the
individual judge's ability and conduct. To use another example, this vote
is intended to play a role similar to that of a worker's performance evalu-
ation within the standard employment context. This is a distinction,
however, that many voters tend to overlook. As a direct consequence,
voters and interest groups often fail to realize that a retention vote should
be based on the "merit" of a judge and upon a judge's entire record of
service. Admittedly, however, this type of information is not always
available or understood. There is a gap in the merit selection process as
it is currently constituted: there is no meaningful system of voter educa-
tion to explain both the merit selection process and the unique role of the
retention voter.
In reality, this has been the principal shortcoming associated with
merit selection systems from the beginning, and the lack of an educa-
tional component has rendered this reform effort incomplete. Without
information as to how the vote is supposed to function, it is little wonder
that voters have associated retention election with the normal elective
process and have acted accordingly. This is an unrecognized problem of
major importance. Any state utilizing merit selection must develop some
form of educational component. There are several ways that this could
be achieved: (1) through the efforts of the bench and bar; (2) through the
efforts of the works of private organizations such as the American Judi-
cature Society; or (3) through an organized public service campaign con-
ducted by a governmental entity. This last method is the most desirable
because such a format will provide added authority and credibility to the
educational efforts. A publicly funded and organized educational cam-
paign is also desirable as the reeducation effort will, in reality, not meet
with immediate success. To achieve meaningful progress will take time
and perhaps innovative programming. An example of the form of public
programming envisioned by this Article would be an effort to integrate
information about merit selection into the state's high school curriculum.
Explaining to students how merit selection operates and how the voter's
role is different within this context may provide meaningful long-term
results. On the other hand, efforts carried on by private groups or the
bench and bar, while not to be discouraged, may be met with some de-
gree of skepticism and resistance by other interest groups or worse, the
public at large.
In sum, educating retention voters about their intended role as a
limited check on the judiciary will allow this system to function as origi-
nally intended. Additionally, such an educational campaign may illus-
trate to voters and interest groups that the removal of a judge will not
necessarily bring about the desired results even if the interest group suc-
ceeds in opposing a candidate's retention-the same nonpolitical process
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will appoint the defeated judge's successor. The merit selection concept,
at its most pure, is designed to remove the idea that the personal views of
judges have any role within the judiciary. Allowing such a system to
function without an educational component simply allows such views to
factor into voting (albeit in less direct fashion), an outcome repugnant to
the entire scheme and concept. If, however, voters and interest groups
are educated as to how the process works, the strategies of interest
groups should adjust to focus on another aspect of the political process
when attempting to influence policy outcomes, allowing merit selection
to properly preserve the tenuous balance between accountability and in-
dependence objectives.
B. INFORMATION RELATED TO INDIVIDUAL JUDGES
In light of the narrow circumstances in which judges would need to
exercise their right to discuss their personal views in merit selection ju-
risdictions, many post-White concerns are no longer of concern. Thus,
the question turns to what information is relevant and should be dis-
closed to voters. The starting point is the concept of merit, the statutory
foundation of the judicial selection process that utilizes retention voting.
Merit refers to worthiness, or the commendable qualities by which
something is evaluated. 170 In large part, merit selection of judges refers
to those abilities and qualities that make the legal system function in a
manner able to achieve the goal of justice. A legal system can be con-
structed with a host of rules and procedural safeguards to help produce
justice, but the only true guarantee, in the end, lies in the "personality of
the judge" selected to operate the system.1 7' "Even in a government of
laws, men [and women] make the decisions."' 72 Thus, merit selection
attempts to capture those human qualities that best serve the legal system
and characterize the judicial role. The ability of a person selected to be a
judge to sustain these qualities into the future then becomes the impor-
tant focus of an informed retention voter in a merit selection state.
The general qualities and virtues of a judge are readily understood,
and have been the subject of considerable commentary. 173 Essentially,
170 See generally Leo A. Romero, Judicial Selection in New Mexico: A Hybrid of Com-
mission Nomination and Partisan Election, 30 N.M. L. Rev. 177, 189-90 (2000) (providing
the criteria utilized by New Mexico's performance evaluation commission in establishing
merit).
171 Maurice Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices-Are They Strainable?, in HANDBOOK
FOR JUDGES 5, 5 (George H. Williams & Kathleen M. Sampson ed., 1984) (quoting Ehrlich,
Freedom of Decision, 9 MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES 65 (1917)).
172 Id.
173 See, e.g., Norman Dorsen, The Selection of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 4 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 652 (2006); Harold J. Krent, Foreword: The Legacy of Chancellor Kent, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 3, 8 (1998).
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these qualities can be culled from the Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
particularly Canon 3.174 In essence, they do not venture far from those
recognized by Socrates-some 2400 years ago: "To hear courteously, to
answer wisely, to consider soberly, and to decide impartially."'' 75 The
difficulty under merit selection lies in measuring and evaluating these
qualities for the retention voter.
In a basic sense, the qualities of a judge are derived from two
sources: what the judge brings to the bench and what the judge takes in
when placed in this role. Under merit selection, a selection commission
can often only rely on the first source, and must predict to a great extent
how the character and qualities of the person will translate into judicial
performance. A retention voter, on the other hand, has the benefit of
both sources. With proper performance and evaluation standards in
place the retention component retains worthy judges and removes judges
who fall short of the selection commission's expectations. Thus there is
a critical need to define both the scope and type of information that
should be provided to retention voters in order to measure judicial per-
formance in a concrete manner. It is important to reiterate that a reten-
tion voter never actually selects a judge. Instead, the voter's
responsibility is only to periodically monitor the judicial performance of
judges and to remove substandard judges-judges who are then replaced
by other judges by the same apolitical merit selection process. Under
this type of retention process, concrete evaluation standards and criteria
are essential to its effective operation and to its very credibility.
While one could point to many qualities that society should value in
judges, the most useful criteria for retention voters are those that are
readily quantifiable. Voters must be able to meaningfully evaluate the
criterion identified as desirable in a judge. For each judge placed on the
retention ballot, information relating to these qualities should be gath-
ered, cataloged, and disseminated to retention voters.
Some commonly recognized qualities are decisiveness, promptness,
and industriousness because a lazy or dilatory judge is a poor judge.' 76
In fact, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to dispose of
the business of the court promptly. 77 One way to transform this quality
into an effective evaluation tool for a retention voter is to provide spe-
cific information about each judge that tracks the timeliness of the
judge's decisions. In many states, trial judges are required to file
monthly reports disclosing cases in which no ruling or decision has been
174 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3 (1990).
175 Rosenberg, supra note 171, at 4.
176 Edward J. Devitt, Ten Commandments for the New Judge, in HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES
33, 36 (George H. Williams & Kathleen M. Sampson eds., 3d ed. 1984).
177 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(8) (1990).
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filed within sixty days after the case's submission. 178 The report must
also disclose the reason for the delay. Of course, there are times when
delay is justified, but the sixty-day rule establishes a general institutional
criterion that can be used to evaluate the judge's industriousness and
promptness. The monthly reports can also be utilized as a comparative
tool to show how an individual judge's compliance record compares with
similarly situated judges.
Other judicial reports can provide similar information relating to
other desirable judicial qualities. Many states require judges to file an-
nual reports that disclose the receipt of outside income and gifts, as well
as the source of the gift or income. 179 While judges are permitted to
teach, write, and engage in other activities unrelated to law, the source of
the income or gift received by a judge could potentially impact a judge's
impartiality, and annual reports allow the public to scrutinize a judge's
gift practices. Similar information can be obtained by analyzing a
judge's continuing education efforts-as judges must attend a minimum
amount of continuing legal education and also disclose the sponsors of
the conferences attended. Although this report can relate to the desirable
quality of judicial competency, identifying the sponsor of an event can
reveal if a judge tends to limit his or her source of continuing education
to events sponsored by particular groups or associations. Ultimately,
similar to gifts from special interest groups, this information can play a
role as a selection criterion.
Information can also be derived from the record of disciplinary ac-
tions taken against a judge. Most states have judicial disciplinary sys-
tems that ultimately disclose founded ethics complaints against judges.
An informed voter should both be aware of and have access to nonconfi-
dential information related to all founded disciplinary action against a
judge.
Yet another potential source of information stems from judge's
written decisions. Judges leave behind a long trail of decisions over the
course of their careers, and this large body of thought and analysis would
seemingly be a fertile source of information for a retention voter. The
problem, however, is finding a method able to quantify a judge's past
decisions into a fair, workable tool for voters within the merit selection
context. Some scholars have attempted to study the past decisions of
appellate judges in order to draw conclusions about the general ap-
178 See, e.g., IOWA CT. R. 22.10 (2006).
179 See, e.g., FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 6(B)(2) (2000); see also IowA CT.
R. 22.26 (2006); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(5) (explaining that a judge
is required to disclose financial information).
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proaches and political preferences of these judges.180 Yet, this type of
information is generally unwanted in a merit selection and retention pro-
cess. The legitimate inquiry for a retention voter in this area would be
whether a.judge has placed personal ideology before the law in making
legal decisions. This, however, is a complex question requiring legal
understanding and as such is generally an inappropriate inquiry.' 81 In-
stead, it is a legal question governed by the code of judicial conduct, and
can only be properly used by a retention voter once decided by a court in
the context of judicial review, or judicial discipline. 182 In the end, any
effort to gather voter information through studies of particular judicial
decisions will only lead to inappropriate discussion and debate.
In contrast, appellate review of trial court decisions can be used as a
helpful guide for a retention voter. An important quality of a judge is
overall competency. In a general sense, a trial judge's record of reversal
of decisions on appeal or review by the appellate courts can provide a
window into the judge's general competency as a decision-maker. Appel-
late courts normally review court decisions to determine if they were
decided correctly, and a reversal can signal that the trial judge was in
error. Of course, the reversal of a particular decision on appeal may not
necessarily relate to professional competency of the decision-maker, and
judges occasionally err-especially when the decision involves a diffi-
cult issue in an unclear area of law or a prompt response in the heat of a
trial. Additionally, principles of judicial restraint can limit the decision-
making choices of a judge in some instances, such as when a judge is
faced with a challenge to judicial precedent. However, a general rela-
tionship between the rate of reversal of a trial judge and the judge's over-
all competency emerges when a judge's record on appeal over time is
compared to the record of all judges, and falls far enough below a stan-
dard deviation as far as the average rate of reversal. For example, an
affirmance rate of 50% for a trial judge compared to an affirmance rate
180 Ward Farnsworth, The Role of Law in Close Cases: Some Evidence from the Federal
Court ofAppeals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2006); see also CARP ET AL., supra note 159, at
320 n.22 (noting the body of empirical data revealing a link between political affiliation and
judicial behavior).
181 There is a fine line between legal error in decision-making and actual misconduct (i.e.
subordinating the law in favor of personal views). Generally, the motive of the judge must be
discerned in order to make this distinction. See Jeffery M. Sherman, Judicial Ethics, 2 GEO. J.
LEGAL Emics 1, 9-11 (1998); see also Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Cleary, 754 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio
2001) (providing an example of a judge placing personal views above the law; in this case, a
judge used a nonstatutory sentencing factor-personal views on abortion-in a sentencing
decision).
182 See In re Holien, 612 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 2000) (providing an example of a judge
failing to follow statutory guidance); see also In re Judges of Mun. Ct. of Cedar Rapids, 130
N.W.2d 553, 554 (Iowa 1964) (providing the standard "A judge has a right to be wrong as far
as our discipline by this court is concerned except as his decision may be reversed or writ
sustained.")
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of 80% for all trial judges would be significant enough deviation to con-
clude a judge is performing below a normal standard of professional
competency. This information does not explain why a particular judge is
wrong more often than other similarly situated judges, but the reason is
not needed for the information to be a useful indicator of judicial
performance.
There are other types and sources of information available in each
merit selection state that could be used in a fair and understandable man-
ner to help make retention voters informed. The growth of court admin-
istration within our nation's court systems now makes it more feasible
than ever to interpret the often opaque work of a judge and transform it
into a multitude of objective statistics that could be useful to retention
voters to assess individual judicial performance. This statistical informa-
tion should be explored and ultimately disseminated to the public, as
long as the statistics are confined to fair and comparative analysis. Sta-
tistics should only be used to expose judicial performance that falls well
outside the range of standard performance. As is discussed in Part IV,
judicial surveys and evaluations by lawyer groups and state programs
have emerged as helpful voter tools. Ultimately, this information should
replace the customary voter preoccupation with the personal views of
candidates and serve to combat the main fear of the White decision: that
it will undermine the basic judicial principles of impartiality and inde-
pendence. In a partisan election state, the White decision cannot under-
mine those bedrock principles any more than the election process itself.
In that respect, White actually takes an honest, forthright approach: if the
voting process contemplates that the voter will rely on the personal views
of a judge as a criterion to cast a vote, then the judges have a right to
provide the voter with information about their personal views. Yet,
White does not affect merit selection in the same manner because merit
selection and retention largely rejects the notion of personal views, and
relies on merit-based criteria. Once the public is educated about its role
and has a means to acquire merit-based information, the concerns mostly
disappear, the system works as contemplated, and the important princi-
ples of impartiality and independence are maintained. This goal, how-
ever, is dependent upon a system that will disseminate this information to
the public in a clear and fair manner.
IV. PROVIDING VOTER INFORMATION-
MERIT SELECTION'S MISSING COMPONENT
It is clear that the retention component of merit selection can best
operate as a procedural safeguard when voters have access to relevant
2008]
376 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:343
information. 83 The task of providing accurate and reliable information
has taken on new importance as interest groups are become increasingly
active in the area of judicial selections. 84 This is not an easy task; espe-
cially as the type of information necessary for a retention voter to make
an informed decision on the retention of an individual judge is not easily
accessible, and the information related to the function of a retention sys-
tem is also lacking in most instances.' 8 5 As a result, the desirability of
some form of evaluation program is patently clear.' 86 This Part ad-
dresses how organizations and states have developed mechanisms to
evaluate judges and, in turn, provide relevant information to voters. To
this end, organizations have been established in two distinct forms: 1) as
subdivisions of the organized bar; or 2) as officially sanctioned subdivi-
sions of the state government.187 In short, the purpose of this Part is to
make a brief argument that a state sponsored judicial performance evalu-
ation program should be a necessary component of merit selection.
A. BAR EVALUATIONS
Overall, "the earliest forms of performance evaluation were often
bar association surveys of members as to their views on the qualities
judges possess for reelection or retention election purposes."1 88 Eventu-
ally, these bar surveys evolved to provide information on more specific
and measurable criteria and to give a more measured view of judges'
183 MARLA N. GREENSTEIN ET AL., Improving the Judiciary Through Performance Evalu-
ation, in THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 225, 227 (Gordon M. Griller
& E. Keith Scott, Jr. eds., 2002) (explaining that "U]udicial performance evaluation programs
are often directed at providing unbiased objective information to the public to assist in assess-
ing judges' qualifications when deciding whether to support the judges' retention in office.").
184 Id. at 234 (explaining that "[i]f the judicial performance evaluation is credible and
respected, that credibility may effectively counter attacks on judges that are not founded on
established judicial qualities.").
185 Seth S. Andersen, Judicial Retention Evaluation Programs, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1375, 1378 (2001) (noting "an increasing lack of voter differentiation among judges on the
same ballot. Voters can and do, albeit extremely-rarely, single out individual judges for defeat,
but analysis of average affirmative voters for all judges on the same ballot shows that 'within a
district the typical judge's affirmative vote differs very little from that of the other judges in
the district.' ").
186 Id. at 1378 (explaining that "U]udicial performance evaluation programs, therefore,
can be premised at least in part of the need to provide voters with more specific information on
each judge" which "will allow [voters] to make individualized decisions rather than voting all
up or down on multiple retention candidates.").
187 See Penny J. White, supra note 169, at 1064-68 (explaining briefly a third method-
media polls-"efforts by newspapers to evaluate judges based on surveys developed and ad-
ministered by the media .... [t]hough possibly well intended, these programs suffer from the
same evils that haunt bar polls including unreliability, insufficiency sampling, and unknowl-
edgeable evaluators.").
188 GREENSTEIN Er AL., supra note 183, at 225.
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fitness for reelection.' 89 An example of this type of evaluation is the
Iowa Bar Plebiscite-an evaluation administered prior to each judicial
retention election cycle.190 The Iowa Bar Plebiscite is distributed to all
members of the Iowa Bar several months before an election and ad-
dresses a large range of issues related to the judge's service and relative
merit. t 9' The response of the organized bar is then distributed to the
state's voters.' 92 The Iowa Bar Plebiscite, in short, provides voters an
insight into the collective view of the organized bar regarding the merit
of sitting judges. 193
The bar survey system, however, is not without detractors as many
"critics argue that bar polls do not accurately reflect the best interests of
the citizenry."' 194 Problems can arise within this context. For example,
not all of the lawyers participating in the poll may actually practice
before the specific judge being evaluated-which weakens the poll's
value as the votes of those familiar with an individual judge are diluted
by those wholly ignorant of the judge's qualifications. 95 Conversely,
problems can also arise if lawyers are familiar with a particular judge, as
lawyers may vote purely based upon their personal experience with the
judge-rather than upon the judge's overall qualifications or other "ob-
jective, appropriate criteria."' 196 There is also some concern that the law-
189 See, e.g., THE IOWA STATE BAR ASS'N, 2006 JUDICIAL PLEBISCITE (2006). The Iowa
Bar Plebiscite evaluates most judges on the following criteria: 1) knowledge and application
of the law; 2) perception of factual issues; 3) punctuality for court proceedings; 4) attentive-
ness to arguments and testimony; 5) management and control of the courtroom; 6) tempera-
ment and demeanor; 7) clarity and quality of written opinions; 8) promptness of rulings and
decisions; 9) avoids undue personal observations or criticisms of litigants, judges, and lawyers
from the bench or in written opinions; 10) decides cases on the basis of applicable law and
fact, not affected by outside influence; 11) is courteous and polite with litigants, lawyers and
court personnel; 12) treats people equally regardless of race, gender, age, national origin, relig-
ion, sexual orientation, socio-economic status or disability. Id. at 1-2. These criteria vary
somewhat depending on the level of court-accounting for the different roles played by judges
in a state court system. Id.
190 See IOWA JUDICIAL BRANCH, 2006 JUDICIAL VOTER GUIDE: A GUIDE TO IOWA'S RE-
TENTION ELECTIONS (2006), http://publications.iowa.gov/archive/00004163/01/Condensed_
Version.pdf (explaining the Iowa Bar Association's Plebiscite). Iowa's Judicial Branch also
publishes a Voter's Guide-providing information about the retention process and the bio-
graphical information of each judge up for retention prior to each election. Id.
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 Id.
194 Roll, supra note 69, at 867.
195 White, supra note 169, at 1065; see also Kelsey Beltramea, Judicial Review, Iowa's
Very Low Key Election, THE DAILY IOWAN, Oct. 31, 2006, at 10 (quoting Iowa Sixth District
Judge Amanda Potterfield on the issue of the representativeness of the bar survey even within
the legal community-"[t]he plebiscite is a good thing, but it's not completely representative,
because not everyone is able to participate"-referring to the fact that only members of the
Iowa Bar Association are eligible to vote and not all members of the legal community maintain
membership).
196 White, supra note 169, at 1064-65.
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yers involved in the actual voting may fear retaliation. 197 Additionally,
"voters . . . have received . . . [bar association] evaluations with some
degree of skepticism, viewing bar associations as trade unions with spe-
cialized concerns that would influence their recommendations." ' 98 Bar
surveys are also unlikely to carry out educational efforts on the two
fronts necessary to ensure merit selection is operating properly-as al-
though information on individual candidates is often provided, informa-
tion explaining the merit process is severely lacking. As a result,
although bar surveys can provide voters with valuable information, this
form of survey is still an incomplete solution to the problem of providing
relevant information to voters within a retention system.
B. STATE JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PROGRAMS
In response to many of the shortcomings associated with the bar
evaluations, several states have adopted state sponsored judicial perform-
ance evaluation programs. t 99 In contrast to bar evaluations, these "pro-
grams... are established by law or court order, and are funded through
the legislature or the judicial branch," which gives these programs an
additional degree of legitimacy.200 Additionally, judicial performance
evaluation programs often incorporate the viewpoints of non-lawyers and
include the voices of "litigants, witnesses, jurors, court staff, probation
officers, social service case workers, and law enforcement officers,"
which help to increase the program's acceptance with the voters of the
state. 201 Commentators note that these evaluation programs can "also
educate and remind the electorate that good judging involves objective,
identifiable criteria, not allegiance to a political philosophy or alliance
with popular sentiment. '20 2 This is perhaps the most meaningful func-
tion that a judicial performance evaluation program can play because
evaluation programs can remind a retention voter of their role as a sub-
stantive check, rather than political actor, and the factors their vote
should be based upon. Despite the clear benefits provided by state spon-
sored judicial performance evaluation programs, currently just six merit
197 Id.
198 GREENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 183, at 227.
199 David C. Brody, Judicial Performance Evaluations by State Governments: Informing
the Public While Avoiding the Pitfalls, 21 JUST. Sys. J. 333, 333-34 (2000) (explaining that
"several states have implemented judicial performance evaluation (JPE) programs designed, in
part, to provide information to the electorate.").
200 Andersen, supra note 185, at 1376; Brody, supra note 199, at 334 (explaining that "the
programs also play the vital role of increasing the level of access given to the public on the
functioning of the court system, and thereby raise the public's confidence in the judiciary.").
201 Brody, supra note 199, at 335.
202 White, supra note 169, at 1077; see also Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer,
Using Judicial Performance Evaluations to Promote Judicial Accountability, 90 JUDICATURE
200, 202 (2007).
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selection jurisdictions-Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Ten-
nessee, and Utah-have implemented this type of program.203
Although state sponsored judicial performance evaluation programs
vary, these entities all strive to achieve the same result: providing rele-
vant and reliable information to the state's voters. 204 Thus, it may be
instructive to examine Colorado's Commission on Judicial Performance
as an example of one state's program. Colorado's program consists of an
overall state commission and twenty-two judicial district commissions
able to evaluate the judges at each respective level of the state's judici-
ary. 205 Each commission consists of ten members who are appointed
according to the state statute which governs this program. 20 6 These com-
missions are in charge of gathering information from a variety of sources
including a random sampling of the attorneys practicing before the judge
and other community members regularly interacting with the judici-
ary. 20 7 As far as evaluative factors, Colorado's program evaluates judges
based on integrity, communication skills, promptness and a number of
other factors related to the judge's qualifications and performance. 20 8
After this information is gathered, the commission is charged with mak-
ing a formal recommendation as far as a judge's retention and then dis-
seminating this information to the public in the form of a "bluebook"
mailed to all voters prior to a retention election. 209 Despite the obvious
expense associated with this form of commission, Colorado has decided
that value exists in providing for an informed decision regarding judicial
retention. While it is true that Colorado has perhaps gone the farthest in
their attempt to fulfill the ideal of a state-sponsored evaluation program,
a more pure form of this entity would obtain truly "measurable" data
such as timeliness of decisions and provide this information (along with
information on the role of voters within the merit system) to the voters
rather than by making a formal recommendation. Such a program would
allow informed voters to directly pass judgment on this data.
In a post-White world, state sponsored evaluation programs may
play a heightened role. Recent scholarship suggests that evaluation pro-
203 Andersen, supra note 185, at 1375-76; see also id. at 1376 (attributing the lack of
progress in expanding this method to "[c]oncerns about the fairness of survey methodologies
and evaluation commission procedures, as well as general reticence among many judges to
subject themselves to an evaluation process that may be seen as a threat to decisional indepen-
dence, have helped to stall the expansion of retention evaluation programs.").
204 Kourlis & Singer, supra note 202, at 203-06.
205 Commissions on Judicial Performance, http://www.cojudicialperformance.com (last
visited Feb. 7, 2007).
206 Id. (stating which state officials appoint members to the committees and what propor-
tion of membership should be attorney vs. non-attorney).
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
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grams can provide a counterbalance to the pressure on voters to 'hold
judges accountable' for politically unpopular outcomes in specific cases,
or to vote for judicial candidates based on those candidates' personal
opinions on hot-button political issues. '210 According to this research,
"Widespread use of JPE programs can dilute this threat to judicial inde-
pendence by shifting public focus away from political positions or partic-
ular case outcomes and toward the process of adjudication." 21 1 In short,
judicial performance evaluation programs can ensure that a retention
vote fulfills its intended role and allow merit selection to operate as the
state intended when adopting this form of selection method.
In addition to the evaluation programs' role in providing informa-
tion on individual judges, an added role for state sponsored evaluation
programs should be to explain how merit selection functions and how
this system is "different" from political votes. Realistically, this reeduca-
tion will not be an easy task. Educational efforts will take years to make
significant progress. The enormity of this task, however, does not dimin-
ish its importance or necessity. A state sponsored evaluation program
may have to be creative to ensure that this message is received. As a
result, evaluation programs would be well served to implement innova-
tive programming such as incorporating information about retention vot-
ing into statewide high school curriculums as well as holding
informational meetings with the media before retention elections. Only a
state sponsored judicial evaluation program, trusted by the state citizenry
as an impartial provider of relevant information, is likely to have the
clout and persistence necessary to carry out such a program of long-term
voter education. Such efforts, however, can only serve to reinforce and
strengthen the role of merit selection in striking an appropriate balance
between accountability and independence in state judicial selections.
CONCLUSION
In 1933, judicial independence and impartiality were strongly tested
in Judge Bradley's small Iowa courtroom. Due to the personal courage
of this jurist, however, the integrity of the judicial branch was left un-
questionably inviolate. In a large sense, merit selection was developed to
ensure that the judicial branch could continue to retain this degree of
integrity and a measure of distance from the political activities of the
elected branches. In the post-White era, the threat of unrestricted judicial
campaign speech, which could eliminate the former distinction between
judicial and political campaigns, entirely remains. Judicial canons, once
able to provide a measure of control, have largely been left ineffective in
210 Kourlis & Singer, supra note 202, at 202.
211 Id.
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the wake of recent court decisions deregulating judicial campaigning. As
a result, an alternative method of regulation is highly desirable. Merit
selection once again provides a nonpolitical solution to the problems
presented by the other forms of judicial selection as adoption of merit
selection's retention election component-a procedural safeguard rather
than a qualitative vote-allows a state to maintain a meaningful balance
between judicial accountability and independence in the post-White
world.

